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Contemporary criminal justice is premised on a rights-bearing defendant safe-guarded from 
arbitrary state punishment by due process. The paucity of academic commentary on the role 
of the criminal defendant suggests that there is a common assumption that the role is static. 
However, the rights-bearing defendant is a relatively new concept. Through a legal history 
analysis, this article demonstrates that the defendant’s role can mutate in response to pressures 
placed on the criminal trial. Broadly, there have been three conceptualisations of the 
defendant; the penitent Anglo-Norman defendant, the advocate defendant of the jury trial, and 
the rights-bearing adversarial defendant. Importantly, the shift from one conceptualisation to 
another has occurred gradually and often without commentary or conscious effort to instigate 
change. There are many contemporary pressures that could be impacting on the rights-bearing 
defendant. The concept of a mutable defendant provides a new theory through which to analyse 
these pressures. This article considers the introduction of adverse inferences regarding the 
right to silence and disclosure, and the rise of ‘digilantism’. These new pressures, it is 
suggested, help to facilitate a rhetoric of deservingness that goes against the rights-bearing 
defendant and raises the risk its role could once again be mutating. 
 
‘DIDN’T GET A TRIAL AND DIDN’T DESERVE ONE’ 
In the early hours of the 2nd May, 2011 US Navy SEALs stormed a Pakistani compound in 
Abbottabad, near the nation’s elite military training base. Five residents of the compound, four 
men and one woman, were fatally shot after a brief gun battle against the American troops. 
There were no SEAL casualties. The then United States’ President, Barack Obama, announced 
the outcome of the mission during a televised conference, stating that ‘justice had been done’ 
to the leader of an organisation ‘committed to killing innocents in our country and across the 
globe’.1 This news resulted in jubilant Americans celebrating in the streets. The SEALs had 
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1 B Obama ‘Osama bin Laden Dead’ (The White House: 2/5/11) 
 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead) [Accessed: 26/2/19]. 
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targeted the man widely considered to have masterminded a series of terrorist attacks, the most 
notable of which was the coordinated plane hijackings on September 11th 2001. Osama bin 
Laden was dead. 
Operation Neptune Spear was highly controversial and its legality has since been 
questioned.2 Nevertheless, it was supported by the majority of Americans.3 Praise for the 
mission came from Republicans as well as Democrats,4 and the global political rhetoric 
appeared to be one of approval that justice had been served. For example, then Prime Minister 
David Cameron described the operation as a ‘great achievement for America, ... [in killing] a 
mass murderer’.5 Similarly, the then United Nations’ Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated 
‘that justice ha[d] been done to such a mastermind of international terrorism’.6 The public 
reaction at the news, and the political approval of the mission, suggests that a criminal verdict 
was not needed for justice to be seen to be done. These sentiments were reflected by legal 
journalist Jeffrey Toobin, who commented in the New Yorker that ‘bin Laden didn’t get a trial 
and didn’t deserve one’.7 Bin Laden was not only denied due process of law but was also 
deemed undeserving of it. 
Bin Laden is an exceptional example and this rhetoric was not universal. Nonetheless, 
the public reaction raises questions about the purpose of the criminal trial. The suggestion that 
an individual may or may not deserve due process or, indeed, a trial at all, challenges the ethos 
of the criminal trial. Yet it needs to be recognised that this type of trial, with the rights-bearing 
 
2 See, for example, K Ambos and J Alkatout ‘Has “Justice Been Done?” The Legality of Bin Laden’s Killing 
Under International Law’ (2012) 45 Israel Law Review 341; and the reply from D Wallace ‘Operation Neptune’s 
Spear: The Lawful Killing of Osama Bin Laden’ 45 Israel Law Review 367. 
3 86 per cent approved of the mission, with 87 per cent believing that it was justified; Associated Press-GfK Roper 
Public Affairs Poll (5-9/5/11) (http://www.pollingreport.com/terror2.htm) [Accessed: 11/5/19]). 
4 J Dao, D Sussman ‘For Obama, Big Rise in Poll Numbers after Bin Laden Raid’ New York Times (New York:  
4/5/11). 
5 D Cameron ‘Bin Laden’s Death “Justice”’ (BBC: 3/5/11) (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13273051 
[Accessed: 11/5/19]). 
6 UN Secretary-General ‘Calling Osama bin Laden’s Death “Watershed Moment”, Pledges Continuing United 
Nations Leadership in Global anti-Terrorism Campaign’ (United Nations: 2/5/11)  
(http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13535.doc.htm) [Accessed: 11/5/19]). 
7 J Toobin ‘Killing Osama: Was it Legal?’ New Yorker (New York: 2/5/11). 
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defendant at its centre, is relatively modern. A historical perspective shows us that the role of 
the defendant has mutated in response to pressures placed on criminal justice, with such 
adaptations going relatively unnoticed by contemporary commentators until irreconcilably 
changed. Moreover, these mutations have often occurred haphazardly and indirectly, and it 
would be naïve to assume that such developments could not be reversed. If the role of the 
defendant can mutate, it is possible that the influence of new pressures could serve to once 
again alter the criminal trial. Viewed in this context, the rhetoric that bin Laden did not deserve 
a trial, from commentators with knowledge of the law and due process, becomes more 
problematic. The public celebration of the death, and the popular discourse of justice served, 
suggests that we might be at the beginning of a new reconceptualisation of the defendant. 
The focus here will be on the criminal procedure of England and Wales, as this is the 
origin of the common law system and thus can provide valuable insight into the mutable 
defendant in a range of jurisdictions. Although legal historians have devoted considerable 
attention to the development of the criminal process, the role of the defendant has largely been 
seen as a side issue. The contrast between the extensive academic commentary on the English 
jury trial, for example, and the paucity of commentary on the defendant suggests a general 
belief that the defendant is a passive receiver of criminal justice. Nevertheless, the literature on 
the historical development of criminal procedure provides a valuable insight into the 
development of the role of the defendant. Reading between the lines, it is possible to identify 
how the concept of the defendant has mutated over time. This article accordingly aims to 
develop a clearer theoretical understanding of the changeable concept of the defendant. 
Focusing on the role of the defendant provides a novel way through which to assess the 
long-term impact that pressures and procedural changes can have on the criminal trial. Whilst 
any amendment to the criminal justice process is usually scrutinised by academics, it is often 
limited to an analysis of the impact of such change on due process. Whilst this is valuable, it 
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does not explain the long-term impact. Acknowledging the defendant as a mutable concept 
allows us to project into the future and assess how even small alterations may have enormous 
consequences on criminal procedure and the philosophy that underpins it. 
 To fully appreciate how the defendant mutates, it is necessary to have a long view of 
history. Changes to the role of the accused occurred gradually and often unnoticed by 
contemporary commentators. Because of this it is impossible to pinpoint exact dates of change 
for the defendant. As such, this article will be divided into three conceptualisations of the 
accused, which follow broad timeframes but are not specific to one particular era. Part one will 
consider the penitent defendant as part of the communal justice mechanisms of Anglo-Norman 
society, designed to deter the damaging tradition of the blood feud. Part two will consider the 
advocate defendant in a jury system that focused on deservingness. Part three will consider the 
development of the rights-bearing defendant, an inadvertent consequence of the introduction 
of defence counsel into the felony trial, who facilitated an adversarial revolution in the 
eighteenth century. The final part of this article will consider the potential impact of new 
pressures on the defendant. Here, it is suggested that a performative defendant is emerging, 
that may be at odds with the rights-bearing defendant. The introduction of adverse inferences 
through the curtailment of the right to silence and the development of the duty to disclose will 
be considered. A discussion of the impact of the new phenomenon of ‘digilantism’ will follow, 
which will analyse the potential impact of online vigilantism on the rights-bearing defendant. 
It must be emphasised that this article does not aim to provide a general history of the 
development of English criminal process. Rather, it seeks to provide an overview of the 
procedural changes throughout a substantial period in English history. By so doing it aims to 
establish the influences that transform the concept of the defendant. 
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THE PENITENT DEFENDANT 
Notions of guilt and innocence in Anglo-Norman society bear no resemblance to modern 
standards. In the small, rural communities of the time, factual guilt was normally known.8 
Indeed, the responsibility for detecting crime in Anglo-Norman society rested with the 
affronted community, expected to raise a hue and cry thereby creating awareness of the act by 
making noise.9 Thus, the justice system did not ascertain factual guilt,10 and intent was not 
taken into account.11 Instead, the trial was designed to restore harmony and prevent the 
damaging blood feud, by ensuring that the community featured heavily in the justice process.12 
The Anglo-Norman trial is described as a process based on proofs and ordeals. The most 
common type of ordeal was that of compurgation, only available to defendants of good 
character.13 Twelve men of good repute14 attested under oath to the defendant’s 
trustworthiness.15 Another ordeal, favoured by the Normans, was the trial by battle, which 
pitted the accused and accuser, or their representatives, against one another in combat.16 
Perhaps the most well-known was the unilateral ordeal. Reserved for those defendants with the 
worst reputations (or those of lower status),17 the unilateral ordeal involved a highly 
orchestrated and religious ceremony, where the supervising priest invited God to pass 
judgement. The rituals were widespread, varied and involved a physical and seemingly painful 
 
8 J Whitman The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial (London: Yale University 
Press, 2008) p 61. 
9 Greenberg ‘The Victim in Historical Perspective: Some Aspects of the English Experience’ (1984) 40 Journal 
of Social Issues 77 pp 85-86; J Baker An Introduction to English Legal History (London: Butterworths, 1990) p 
574. Indeed, those who failed to raise a hue and cry risked prosecution themselves. 
10 Ibid Baker p 85. 
11 J Hostettler A History of Criminal Justice in England and Wales (Hook: Waterside Press, 2009) p 15. 
12 D Stenton English Justice Betweeen the Norman Conquest and the Great Charter 1066-1215 (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1965) pp 6-7. 
13 P Hyams ‘Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law’ in M Arnold, T Green, S Scully, S 
White, (eds) On the Laws and Customs of England (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981) p 93; 
T Green Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800 (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985) p 10. 
14 Known formally as juratores or oath-helpers. 
15 Baker above n 9 p 87. 
16 For further detail, see Whitman above n 8 pp 78-79; Hyams above n 13 p 93. 
17 Ibid Hyams p 122; Ibid Whitman n 8 p 61. 
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test, with the most common being hot or cold trials.18 
 The system of ordeals provided an indisputable verdict. The twelve individuals required 
for the ordeal of compurgation would have been a significant proportion of the small 
communities of this period and the process thus provided a high reconciliation threshold.19 
Those defendants that passed the compurgation did so because the community attested, in 
essence, to their good character. Similarly, the outcome of the trial by battle was an indisputable 
mechanism through which the parties could literally fight out their grievances. The unilateral 
physical ordeal was reserved for the most contentious of defendants, where communal 
reconciliation might prove difficult.20 The fact that they were judged by the divine played into 
superstition and faith and provided an outcome that was difficult for the accuser to disagree 
with.21 The ordeals were a process centred not around the suspect or the victim, but on the 
wrong caused and the disharmony that resulted as a consequence of the crime.22 In the small 
rural communities of Anglo-Norman society, discord could be inherently destabilising. The 
ordeal provided a mechanism that reinforced the need for stability and cohesiveness by 
ensuring that justice remained communal. 
There is convincing evidence to suggest that the ordeals were merciful, granting the 
accused an opportunity to atone for their sins.23 For example, although cursory readings of trial 
by unilateral ordeal depict a brutal ceremony where the accused was twice damned,24 it appears 
 
18 M Kerr, R Forsyth and M Plyley ‘Cold Water and Hot Iron: Trial by Ordeal in England’ (1992) 22 The Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History 573. 
19 R Helmholz ‘Crime, Compurgation and the Courts of the Medieval Church’ (1983) 1 Law and History Review 
1 p 13; Hyams above n 13 p 93. 
20 P Brown ‘Society and the Supernatural: A Medieval Change’ (1975) 104 Daedalus 133 p 138. 
21 C Radding ‘Superstition to Science: Nature, Fortune, and the Passing of the Medieval Ordeal’ (1979) 84 The 
American Historical Review 945 p 956. 
22 T Olson ‘Of Enchantment: The Passing Of The Ordeals And The Rise Of The Jury Trial’ (2000) 50 Syracuse 
Law Review 109. 
23 Ibid; see also Hyams above n 13 pp 95, 98. 
24 For example, the ordeal of hot iron required the accused to hold a red-hot iron rod, blessed by the supervising 
priest, nine paces. The wound would then be bandaged and left for three days. If, after three days, the wound had 
festered, then the accused was deemed guilty by God. Either way, the accused had to suffer the pain of red-hot 
iron on skin. Similarly, in the most common ordeal of cold water, the accused’s hands were bound behind their 
knees and they were then submerged in a twelve-foot-deep pool of water. If the accused floated, they were 
considered guilty, the holy water having expelled the individual, if the accused sank, risking drowning, they were 
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that it operated as a form of penance to allow those defendants of bad repute to rehabilitate 
back into the community.25 Indeed, there appears to be consensus amongst academics that the 
ordeals had a high success rate,26 something that was noted with frustration by some 
contemporary commentators.27 It was not unusual in this society for religious penance to be 
physical and painful, something the unilateral ordeal appeared to emulate. This is not to suggest 
that justice in this time was fair, indeed a system that depended on the participation of the 
community were undoubtedly influenced by its prejudices. This could be problematic for 
unpopular individuals, vulnerable to false accusations.28 It is possible that there were 
defendants who underwent the pains of the unilateral ordeal simply because they were disliked. 
The trial by ordeal became an unsuitable mode of justice as English society developed 
and became less insular.29 By the thirteenth century, society and the Catholic Church were 
moving away from the ‘mystical expedients’30 of the ordeal towards a philosophy based on 
rational proofs and natural phenomenon, rather than divine interference.31 The ordeals were 
finally eliminated in 1215. For most of Europe the replacement was the forensic and systematic 
Roman-canon method, which gave rise to the inquisitorial methodology.32 For English criminal 
justice, by contrast, the alternative was the already present jury trial. 
 
THE ADVOCATE DEFENDANT  
The first juries in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries drew upon local knowledge of the crime 
 
deemed innocent. F Liebermann Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen (Halle (Saale): Niemeyer, 1903) p 530. Note: I 
am grateful to Dr Anne Wesemann for providing the translation for this text, the original of which is in German. 
25 Olson above n 22 pp 125-127, 149-152. 
26 Kerr et al above n 18. 
27 See Whitman above n 8 p 65. 
28 Ibid quoting English theologian John of Wales p 86; see also A Harding The Law Courts of Medieval England 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973) p 26 
29 Hyams above n 13 p 100. 
30 M-D Chenu Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century (London: University of Chicago Press, 1968) p 
5. 
31 Ibid pp 4-18. 
32 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the development of the Roman-canon method, for further detail 
see R Vogler A World View of Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Whitman above n 8 pp 92-124. 
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and the defendant.33 Thus, the jury came to the courtroom more to speak than to listen34 and 
external witness testimony during the trial was rare.35 Determining guilt for this ‘self-informing 
jury’,36 therefore, was reminiscent of the ordeal; enabling reconciliation to remain a factor in 
adjudication.37 The jury proved willing to deliver partial verdicts or acquit entirely defendants 
of good character, first offenders, or with dependants to support.38 From the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, juries were increasingly drawn from the county as a whole, rather than 
from the affected community.39 Jury selection began to focus as much on the status of the juror 
as on his proximity to the crime.40 The trial gradually shifted from reconciliation, to the 
regulation of immoral behaviour. For example, the jury frequently devalued stolen goods for 
deserving defendants so as to avoid an automatic capital sanction.41 Therefore, a death sentence 
was reserved only for those defendants considered beyond hope of salvation, something that 
Parliament appeared to rely on when legislating crimes.42 As a result, defendants accused of 
apparently wicked offences that were believed to instigate a slide into immorality – such as 
those involving alcohol, gambling or other ‘corrosive temptations’ – were less likely to be 
considered deserving of mitigation.43 The need to assess a defendant’s morality created an 
‘accused’s speaks’44 trial, vocally responding to the accusations made against them. In this way 
 
33 Ibid pp 181-183. 
34 J Langbein The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p 64. 
35 D Klerman ‘Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?’ (2003) 77 Southern California Law Review 123 pp 138-143. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Olson above n 22 pp 177-181. 
38 B McLane ‘Juror Attitudes Toward Local Disorder: The Evidence of the 1328 Linolnshire Trailbaston 
Proceedings’ in J Cockburn and T Green (eds) Twelve Good Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 
1200-1800 (Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1988) pp 47-53. See also M Macnair ‘Vicinage and the 
Antecedents of the Jury’ (1999) 17 Law and History Review 537 pp 576-578. 
39 Langbein above n 34 p 64; P Lawson ‘Lawless Juries? The Composition and Behaviour of Hertfordshire Juries, 
1573-1624’ in J Cockburn and T Green (eds) Twelve Good Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 
1200-1800 (Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1988) p 123. 
40 For detail on the development of the jury system at this time see B Shapiro ‘Religion and the Law: Evidence, 
Proof and “Matter of Fact”, 1660-1700’ in N Landau (ed) Law, Crime and English Society, 1660–1830 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  2002). Ibid Lawson pp 123-124. 
41 Prescribed for theft of goods over 40 shillings see J Beattie Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp 421-423. 
42 Ibid p 421. 
43 Ibid p 421. 
44 Langbein above n 34 pp 48-61.  
9 
the defendant can be described as an advocate defendant, expected to convince the jury that 
they did not deserve a conviction or the maximum sentence. 
The expectation that defendants would advocate their own defence was a considerable 
challenge in a criminal trial that was a bewildering process for most defendants ‘who were for 
the most part dirty, underfed and surely often ill’.45 Under such circumstances the defendant is 
not likely to provide a vigorous cross-examination of the evidence.46 The pressure on the 
advocate defendant was further exacerbated by the supposition that they were the best person 
to know the facts of the crime, having been close enough to events to be accused.47 In this way, 
there was a subtle but underlying presumption of guilt. Unlike defence witnesses, prosecution 
testimony was delivered under oath, lending considerable authority to the accusations.48 
Indeed, judges were known to instruct the jury not to put too much weight on the unsworn 
testimony of the accused.49 This was exacerbated by the fact that a private prosecutor was 
considered to be a witness, and therefore impartial, whereas the defendant was not.50 
Furthermore, unlike prosecution witnesses, defence witnesses could not be compelled to 
testify.51 This was to avoid contradictory sworn testimony in the courtroom, which, it was 
believed, would have forced one party to perjure themselves and face eternal damnation.52 The 
effect of this was to provide an inherent prosecutorial bias in courtroom proceedings. 
 The challenges facing the advocate defendant increased in the sixteenth century with 
this prosecutorial bias being statutorily entrenched by the Marian Statutes.53 This legislation 
aimed to improve an investigatory deficit in English criminal law that was a consequence of 
 
45 Beattie above n 42 pp 350-351. 
46 Ibid pp 350-351. 
47 Ibid p 241. 
48 G Fisher ‘The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector’ (1997) 107 Yale Law Journal 575 pp 604-609. 
49 J Cockburn A History of English Assizes 1558-1714 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972) p 121. 
50 Langbein above n 34 p 38. 
51 Fisher above n 49 604-609. 
52 Ibid pp 604-609. 
53 For further detail see J Langbein Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973). 
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the demise of the self-informing jury.54 Acquittals due to a lack of evidence were common and 
sometimes there was no trial at all.55 This created a perception that crimes were going 
unpunished due to a reluctance by the victim to instigate proceedings.56 By extending the 
powers of the Justices of the Peace (JP)57 to investigate crimes and compel prosecutions,58 the 
statutes added an official element to the investigation of the crime and regulated the role of the 
private prosecutor.59 The JPs were given no authority to investigate more widely, meaning that 
the increased powers were limited to prosecution evidence.60 
There is evidence to suggest that this prosecutorial bias was unintentional.61 It is clear 
from the preamble of the statute that the legislation did not aim to alter the procedure of the 
criminal trial.62 Instead, the focus of the statute appeared to stem from a desire to make 
prosecution more effective and keep it local and cheap.63 The fact that obviously guilty 
defendants were being tried at all was probably regarded as a substantial progression of 
defensive rights.64 Thus, it is possible that the prosecutorial bias of the sixteenth century 
courtroom went unnoticed by state officials.65 
This bias, however, made the defendant vulnerable to abuse of power, which was 
exploited during a period of royal authoritarianism in the seventeenth century. Judges and juries 
 
54 J Langbein ‘The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law’ (1973) 17 American Journal of Legal History 
313 pp 317-324. 
55 Cockburn above n 50 p 127. 
56 Powell ‘Jury Trial at Gaol Delivery in the Late Middle Ages: The Midland Circuit, 1400-1429’ in J Cockburn 
and T Green (eds) Twelve Good Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200-1800 (Guildford: 
Princeton University Press, 1988) p 107. 
57 JPs had an administrative local role and were responsible for maintaining law and order in local communities. 
As a result of the Marian Statutes their criminal investigation became an official part of the trial. JPs could 
interview the accused and any witnesses. These interviews could now become part of the evidence at trial, which 
crucially did not have to be written down verbatim or even at the time of examination. Langbein above n 54 p 24. 
58 Ibid Langbein pp 6-15. 
59 Ibid pp 34-35. 
60 Langbein above n 34 p 43. 
61 Langbein above n 54 pp 11, 26, 38-39. 
62 Green above n 13 p 110. Indeed, Langbein suggests that the drafter drew upon established practice, rather than 
looking to instigate a new process, ibid p 65. 
63 Langbein above n 55 p 335. 
64 Langbein above n 34 p 65. 
65 Ibid p 65. 
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who issued verdicts that ran contrary to the will of the crown could be investigated and 
punished.66 The result was the near extinction of an independent judiciary in a criminal justice 
system that was influenced by state authoritarianism and an over-zealous criminal law.67 Judges 
who did not wish to accept a jury verdict could question each juror individually as to the reason 
behind their decision.68 During one notable trial of a group of Catholics, led by Richard White, 
the jury asked the judge ‘whom they should acquit and whom they should find guilty’.69 Juries 
who deliberated for an undue length of time could be denied food, drink, candles and fires until 
a verdict was reached.70 
 The power imbalance between the prosecutor and defendant was starkly illustrated in a 
series of treason trials in the late seventeenth century. The increasing use of constructive treason 
meant that the scope of the crime could be expanded to prosecute political defendants, 
rendering it very difficult for the accused to establish a defence.71 As with felony trials, 
defendants were not able to see the indictment, nor were they able to compel witnesses to testify 
at trial.72 The most prominent criticism of the treason trial was against the prohibition of 
defence counsel, which, it was argued, compounded the prosecutorial bias, particularly as the 
crown invariably hired lawyers.73 
Royal persecution of the Whigs led to repeated calls for reform of the treason trial. 
Abuse of royal power had ensured the conviction and execution several defendants for treason, 
but who were probably innocent.74 Eventually, the Treason Trials Act was passed in 1696, with 
 
66 Green above n 13 p 141. 
67 Langbein above n 34 pp 80-81. 
68 Green above n 13 p 140. 
69 J Bellamy The Tudor Law of Treason (Abingdon: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979) p 169. 
70 Ibid p 168; see also Green above n 13 p 140. 
71 J Phifer ‘Law, Politics, and Violence: The Treason Trials Act of 1696’ (1980) 12 Albion: A Quarterly Journal 
Concerned with British Studies 235 p 237; A Shapiro ‘Political Theory and the Growth of Defensive Safeguards 
in Criminal Procedure: The Origins of the Treason Trials Act of 1696’ (1993) 11 Law and History Review 215 p 
221. 
72 Langbein above n 34 pp 83-84. 
73 Langbein ‘The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers’ (1978) 45 The University of Chicago Law Review 263 p 307 
74 Langbein above n 34 pp 68-78. 
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the aim of redressing the procedural imbalance. The Act established that the underlying 
principle in treason trials should be equality of arms, rather than deference to the monarch. The 
defendant in these rare cases was now entitled to a number of pre-trial rights, such as being 
able to see the indictment, that embraced this new equality. 
While the defensive protections of the Treason Trials Act were limited to the very rare 
crime of treason, it was the first example of a rights-bearing defendant. Moreover, it provides 
an example of a conscious effort to change the role of the accused in the criminal trial. It is 
important to note the limited scope of the 1696 Act; the defendant’s role in felony trials 
remained unchanged.75 The notion of a universal rights-bearing defendant developed over the 
course of the subsequent century as a result of the increasing presence of defence counsel. 
Despite being officially prohibited from the felony trial until 1836,76 remarkably defence 
counsel facilitated the adversarial revolution that saw the advocate defendant transformed to 
one regarded as rights-bearing. 
 
THE RIGHTS-BEARING DEFENDANT 
The notion of a defendant deserving of rights developed over the course of the eighteenth 
century. Influenced by Enlightenment ideals, which championed individualism and the 
rationality of mankind;  at the heart of the adversarial procedure was an acknowledgment of 
the power imbalance between the state and the defendant.77 Thus, due process protections 
emerged during an adversarial revolution in the English courts,78 as part of the recognition that 
the state had access to substantially greater resources. 
 
75 B Smith ‘The Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750-1850’ (2005) 23 Law and History 
Review 133. 
76 For further information about the prohibition of defence counsel in felony trials see T P Gallanis ‘Making Sense 
of Blackstone’s Puzzle: Why Forbid Defense Counsel?’ in A Sarat (ed) Studies in Law, Politics and Society 
(Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2010). 
77 Vogler above n 32 pp 129-130. 
78 R Vogler ‘Due Process’ in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
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Although scholars have traced due process-like phraseology such as ‘innocent until 
proven guilty’ as far back as thirteenth century inquisitorial jurists,79 such terminology does 
not indicate defensive safeguards. These inquisitorial provisions were not concerned with 
safeguarding the defendant but on ensuring an indisputable verdict.80 Indeed, the defendant 
was not considered to be an important component of the inquisitorial trial, which could convict 
and sentence without the presence of the accused.81 It is for this reason that due process is seen 
here as an adversarial concept. This is not to say that the adversarial methodology was better 
than the inquisitorial process. Indeed, the professionalised bureaucracy of the Continental 
methods created a sophisticated system of evidence that ensured that the defendant could be 
convicted only on the highest standard of proof, something that was not afforded to the English 
defendant.82  
One of the prevailing characteristics of the adversarial criminal trial is the presence of 
lawyers. Defence counsel drastically changed the concept of the defendant and did much to 
address the long-standing procedural imbalance of the trial. Initially their range of activities 
was severely restricted. Lawyers were allowed to cross-examine witnesses and raise points of 
law but they were unable to directly address the jury or argue against facts put in evidence.83 
However, lawyers had obvious incentives to challenge any and all evidence against their client, 
and to utilise strategy in order to win the case.84 Despite these restrictions, over time they 
transformed the criminal trial from a brief and often bewildering experience for the defendant, 
 
79 K Pennington ‘Innocent until Proven Guilty: The Origins of a Legal Maxim’ (2003) 63 Jurist 106; Eichbauer 
‘Medieval Inquisitorial Procedure: Procedural Rights and the Question of Due Process in the 13th Century’ (2014) 
12 History Compass 72 pp 74-75; Brundage ‘Full and Partial Proof in Classical Canonical Procedure’ (2007) 67 
Jurist 58; M Damaška ‘The Quest for Due Process in the Age of Inquisition’ (2012) 60 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 919. 
80 Langbein Torture and the Law of Proof (University of Chicago Press 1977) p 6. An inquisitorial defendant 
could only be convicted if proof of guilt was ‘more clear than daylight’. See also R Andrews Law, Magistracy 
and Crime in Old Regime Paris, 1735-1789, vol 1: The System of Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) p 442. 
81 Ibid p 36. 
82 Ibid pp 25-30. 
83 J Beattie ‘Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries’ (1991) 9 Law and History Review 221 p 231. 
84 Ibid pp 531, 560. 
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into a zealous and combative process.85 The introduction of due process safeguards, such as 
the presumption of innocence, the beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof86 – placing the 
evidentiary burden on the prosecution, and the notion of equality of arms can be attributed, at 
least in part, to the presence of defence counsel in the courtroom.87 
 Despite their influence, there was no clear policy in the eighteenth century to introduce 
counsel for all defendants, or to instigate what would be a drastic procedural transformation.88 
Procedural change in the criminal courts was slow. It is likely that this ‘lulled the bench into 
inaction until the lawyers had become entrenched’.89  What is remarkable is that this procedural 
revolution, and the new conceptualisation of the accused, came about seemingly unnoticed by 
courtroom personnel and political elites until it was too late to change it. What had begun as 
the introduction of counsel in rare instances developed into a procedural revolution that 
simultaneously silenced and protected the accused. 
 The adversarial procedure was not formally endorsed until the nineteenth century. The 
passage of the Prisoner’s Counsel Act 1836 afforded felons the statutory right to defence 
counsel who were empowered to address the jury directly and offer observations on the 
evidence.90 Provisions such as the Indictable Offences Act in 1848, which granted the 
defendant a right to silence, made accessing a lawyer increasingly necessary in order to 
understand proceedings, let alone successfully arguing a defence in court. The Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898 reinforced this right to silence, by stating that the defendant could not be 
compelled to testify.91 Thus, the rights-bearing adversarial defendant came to be seen as a 
 
85 Ibid p 543. 
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passive receiver of justice. The need for counsel and for the prosecution to prove guilt became 
essential features of the English criminal trial. 
The adversarial process was also physically entrenched in the courtroom, the layout of 
which now formally reflected the dominance of lawyers. The open court of the fifteenth 
century, whereby spectators were free to move about the courtroom,92 had changed by the 
Victorian era. By the eighteenth century, purpose-built courthouses were emerging, separating 
court personnel and providing a more distinct space for counsel.93 The accused became 
completely separated from proceedings, placed in a dock, on the edge of the courtroom, and 
enclosed.94 This starkly highlighted their criminal status and championed the adversarial 
dominance of the lawyer.95 
 The rights-bearing defendant became further entrenched through codified pre-trial 
safeguards. These included the Metropolitan Police Regulations 1873, which prohibited the 
police from forcing a confession,96 and the introduction of Judges’ Rules in 1912, providing 
guidelines for the police investigation that ensured it respected due process.97 However, these 
safeguards were largely introduced in a piecemeal and ad hoc manner. It was a series of high-
profile miscarriages of justice in the 1970s and ‘80s that powerfully demonstrated the need to 
regulate the investigation stage and facilitated the passage of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act (PACE) in 1984.98 PACE provided a raft of pre-trial safeguards such as the right to access 
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a lawyer,99 limits on the length of detention without charge100 and treatment whilst in 
custody.101 The concept of a rights-bearing defendant is now a fundamental component of 
English criminal justice, protected throughout the whole criminal justice process. 
 
THE PERFORMATIVE DEFENDANT: A TURNING POINT?  
As the rights-bearing defendant became entrenched, the criminal trial became more 
complicated, longer and more expensive. One key aspect of the rights-bearing defendant is 
their non-participatory role. It is for the state to bring proceedings and to prove guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt.102 A desire for efficiency has influenced the rhetoric surrounding the criminal 
process in the latter part of the twentieth century and has led some to query if this marks the 
demise of adversariality.103 It has established new means of requiring the defence to participate 
in the process. This new ‘participatory model of procedure’104 is based on the expectation that 
an innocent defendant has nothing to hide. 
 History has demonstrated how incremental changes to the criminal justice process can have 
profound implications for the role of the defendant. It is suggested here that these reforms could 
be creating a performative defendant, expected to engage with the criminal justice process as 
a way of demonstrating their innocence. This not only has implications for the adversarial 
criminal trial as a whole but could be an indication that the role of the defendant is changing 
once again. This section will consider two pressure points on the criminal trial that could 
entrench this performative defendant: the introduction of adverse inferences and the rise of so-
called ‘digilantism’. In short, we are asking here whether, as in the 1730s, we are at the cusp 
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of another turning point in the criminal justice process. 
 
Obligatory Participation: Adverse inferences 
The requirement that the defendant must participate can be seen in the introduction of adverse 
inferences through the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA) and part 5 of the 
Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1993, which amended provisions in the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996. Sections 34-37 CJPOA allow the jury to make inferences ‘as 
appear proper’105 from the defendant’s failure to advance a defence within a reasonable 
timeframe, or from a failure to answer questions under certain circumstances, most 
controversially when questioned by the police (s34).106 Similarly, the CPIA, as amended by the 
CJA, places burdens on both the prosecution and defence to disclose any elements of their case 
that may assist the opposing party.107 The prosecution has long had a general duty to disclose,108 
but for the first time the defence are now under a similar obligation. The accused must now 
provide a defence statement to the court,109 stipulating the nature of their defence, the matters 
of fact and points of law that they intend to rely upon and any issues (and why) they have with 
the prosecution’s case.110 
 The introduction of adverse inferences were designed to achieve parity between the 
prosecution and the defence, after the passage of PACE was felt to have tipped the balance too 
far towards the accused.111 There was a particular fear that the new right to legal advice (s58 
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PACE) would provide a major obstacle to police investigation by hindering the suspect 
interview.112 There was also concern that s58 could lead to an increase in so-called ambush 
defences, whereby the accused would refuse to proffer a defence until the last minute as a 
strategy to undermine the prosecution’s case.113 Problematically the legislation failed to 
adequately assess the evidence pertaining to this area of law. This has led Quirk to state that 
the CPIA in particular ‘appears to have been drafted in a vacuum’,114 an accusation that can 
also be levied on the CJPOA. By introducing adverse inferences, the reforms have had the 
inadvertent effect of requiring the defendant to perform or run the risk of being perceived as 
guilty. 
 
Right to silence 
The curtailment of the right to silence has been described as ‘one of the most controversial 
reforms of English criminal law in the last century’.115 Its introduction was based on a fear that 
it was being widely used to obstruct criminal justice. Research had consistently found that the 
right to silence was rarely exercised and when it was used, it had little bearing on guilt.116 
Rather, there were more innocuous reasons for remaining silent, for example because of 
cultural hostility to the police.117 Two safeguards were written into the CJPOA, ostensibly to 
protect vulnerable defendants. Guilt cannot be determined based on the silence of the accused 
alone (s38(3)), nor can inference be made if the accused’s physical or mental condition makes 
 
112 Although the CJPOA cover a range of situations including silence in the courtroom, Greer notes that most of 
the debate focussed on the right to silence in the police station ibid p 719. 
113 H Quirk The Rise and Fall of the Right to Silence (London: Routledge, 2018) pp 24-49; R Leng ‘Losing Sight 
of the Defendant: The Government's Proposals on Pretrial Disclosure’ (1995) Criminal Law Review 704 p 705. 
114 H Quirk ‘The Significance of Culture in Criminal Procedure Reform: Why the Revised Disclosure Scheme 
Cannot Work’ (2006) 10 The International Journal of Evidence & Proof 42 p 44. 
115 A Jennings ‘Silence and Safety: The Impact of Human Rights Law’ (2000) Criminal Law Review 879 p 879. 
116 Leng found that 4.5 per cent of suspects relied on the right to silence during interview and that ambush defences 
amounted to ‘at most’ 5 per cent of trials. Above n 114 p 20. ‘The Right to Silence in Police Interrogation: A 
Study of Some of the Issues Underlying the Debate’ (1993) The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice pp 20, 
58. 
117 D Dixon ‘Politics, Research and Symbolism in Criminal Justice: The Right of Silence and the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act’ (1991) 20 Anglo-American Law Review 27 p 42. 
19 
it undesirable to testify at court (s35(1)(b)). However, as Birch notes of s38(3), it ‘is impossible 
to police’.118 
 Judicial interpretation has expanded the scope of s34-37119 and provides a powerful 
demonstration of how such reforms could be transforming the rights-bearing defendant. In 
Condron120 the Court of Appeal held that inferences could be drawn despite legal advice to 
remain silent.121 This is problematic given that the curtailment of the right to silence was 
ostensibly because of the introduction of legal advice. As Quirk points out ‘[t]his means that 
suspects have not received the protections that Parliament intended, and that some of the 
protections of PACE have been weakened without direct legislative authority’.122 Although 
silence should not establish a prime face case, it appears that the courts are willing to do just 
that. In Hart123 the defendant was convicted of knowingly importing cannabis. He remained 
silent during interview and at trial; the only evidence against him was a piece of paper with a 
Spanish mobile number found in his pocket on arrest. His appeal was allowed due to poor 
judicial direction.124 However, as Birch notes, ‘that he was convicted in the first place suggests 
that juries are capable of attaching considerable, and misplaced, significance on silence’.125 
The implication of these cases is that passivity being equated with guilt. 
 There is evidence to suggest that the right to silence was being eroded even before the 
introduction of adverse inferences. In 1976 the Court of Appeal in Chandler126 found that the 
presence of a solicitor equalised the position between the defendant and the police. As a result, 
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the jury could infer the defendant’s silence as an acceptance of the accusations. Similarly, in 
Alladice127 in 1980 the Court of Appeal, alluding to ambush defences, stated that as a result of 
s58 PACE ‘the balance of fairness between prosecution and defence cannot be maintained 
unless proper comment is permitted on the defendant’s silence’.128 Even prior to PACE, the 
Court of Appeal commented that juries rarely acquitted if the defendant remained silent.129 
Parallels can be drawn between the CJPOA and the Marian Statutes; both being pieces of 
legislation that attempted to make the criminal trial more efficient, but in actual fact may have 
simply codified established, or emerging, practice. Crucially, the Marian Statutes eventually 
led to profound changes to the role of the defendant. The CJPOA could be doing the same. 
 
Disclosure 
The disclosure reforms similarly make a tenuous conclusion that failure to disclose equates to 
guilt. As Owusu-Bempah notes, ‘the defendant’s failure to disclose … before trial is only 
suspicious because the law places an obligation on him to do so’.130 Thus, the defendant is not 
only considered suspicious if they remain passive and silent, they are also suspicious if they do 
not perform and cooperate with the justice process. The implications for the rights-bearing 
defendant are clear; passivity no longer appears to be something deemed to be in need of 
protecting. 
 Initially, judges appeared reluctant to draw adverse inferences for failure to disclose. As a 
result, the applicability of adverse inferences under CPIA are ambiguous, when, for example, 
disclosure is made late or is insufficiently detailed.131 Unlike the right to silence, the law on 
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disclosure has generated little case law.132 It appears that most judges at least initially preferred 
to verbally chastise rather than sanction non-compliance.133 Nevertheless, the obligation to 
disclose is being expanded. The amendments of the CJA, which aims to ‘give sharper teeth to 
the enforcement of defence disclosure’,134 extended defence (and prosecution) disclosure 
obligations and made sanctioning non-compliance easier. It  now appears that the defence 
statement is now being used to evidence the actus reus component of a crime,135 the obligation 
to disclose is also not absolved by legal advice.136 Neither of these new expansions were an 
intended consequence of the statutes.  
 The introduction of the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR) has also increased the impact 
of the disclosure obligations. Designed to promote efficiency in the criminal trial and 
encourage cooperation between the parties, the CrimPR also introduces a more proactive role 
for the judiciary, threatening adversarialism.137 Despite an initial reluctance to sanction failure 
to disclose, it appears that, as a result of CrimPR, the courts are increasingly viewing disclosure 
as a duty in the interests of justice.138 Crucially, the courts have, on several occasions, 
perpetuated the suspicion that the defendant’s failure to disclose was tactical.139 As a result, it 
appears to be increasingly difficult for the defendant to appeal against their disclosure 
obligations.140 
 
132 See, for example, McEwan above n 104 pp 530-531. 
133 P Darbyshire ‘Judicial Case Management in Ten Crown Courts’ (2014) Criminal Law Review 30 pp 40-41; F 
Garland and J McEwan ‘Embracing the Overriding Objective: Difficulties and Dilemmas in the New Criminal 
Climate’ (2012) 16 The International Journal of Evidence & Proof 233. Although Paragraph 3A.26 of the 
Criminal Practice Directions 2015 makes informal chastisement less likely, however, as the court must now record 
failures to comply with the CrimPR and could require the parties to attend a hearing to explain their lack of 
compliance. 
134 Redmayne above n 132 pp 446-449. 
135 For example, in R v Firth [2011] EWHC 388 (Admin) where the defendant made a statement on a case 
progression form stating that the only contact made was in self-defence. The prosecution were able to rely on this 
statement to prove the touching element required for ABH. Ibid Redmayne p 450. 
136 R v Essa [2009] EWCA Crim 43. 
137 McEwan above n 104. 
138 Malcolm v DPP [2007] EWHC 363 (Admin); Firth v Epping Magistrates’ Court [2011] EWHC 388 (Admin). 
139 R v Penner [2010] EWCA Crim 1155; R v Farooqi [2013] EWCA Crim 1649; R v Chorley Magistrates’ Court 
[2006] EWHC 1795 (Admin). 
140 See Owusu-Bempah above n 131 pp 159-160. 
22 
 The obligations of the CrimPR also extended to summary offences. Most disclosure 
obligations only apply to cases in the Crown Court; s6 CPIA makes it clear that disclosure in 
the magistrates’ courts is voluntary. Crucially, rule 3.11 states that the parties are under an 
obligation to complete a case management form in which they identify the order of their 
evidence, including points of law and information about witnesses that are relevant to their 
case. This has been described as ‘akin to completing a defence case statement under the 
CPIA’.141 Thus the CrimPR could be an expansion of disclosure through the back door. 
 It is possible that this new requirement to participate is merely a recalibration of the rights-
bearing defendant, rather than a new conceptualisation. However, this would only be possible 
if the principle of equality of arms was maintained at all stages of the criminal justice process. 
Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case. For example, although s23 CPIA creates a 
disclosure officer, responsible for the cataloguing of the evidence acquired, training for this 
role is often poor. As a result officers can fail to understand the importance of a job that requires 
value judgments of the evidence to be made.142 Furthermore, the neutrality required from the 
disclosure officer contradicts a pervasive attitude amongst the police that they are ‘salesmen 
for jail’.143 Not only does this suggest a lack of a presumption of innocence at the pre-trial 
phase, it contrasts with the conduct of defence counsel who need to ensure a good working 
relationship with the police and are therefore less likely to be adversarial in the police station.144 
The collapse of recent cases due to police failure to disclose demonstrates fundamental flaws 
in the system.145 The growing use of smartphones and other technologies means that the 
category of potential evidence is growing exponentially. Recent cuts to police budgets make it 
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increasingly difficult for the police to sift through all the evidence accumulated. These factors 
create a perfect storm for miscarriages of justice. 
 The introduction of adverse inferences has impacted on the rights-bearing defendant. The 
erosion of the right to silence ensures that a passive defendant is perceived to be a guilty one. 
The introduction of the obligation to disclose, however, goes one step further by requiring the 
defendant to perform to expectations of what innocent behaviour looks like. As then Home-
Secretary Michael Howard stated, ‘I do not believe that the innocent have anything to fear from 
the changes.’146 This new attitude towards the defendant, ‘makes a number of untested 
assumptions about the “natural” behaviour of suspects’.147 Nevertheless the view that a passive 
defendant is a guilty one appears to be growing. It is even perpetuated amongst some defence 
counsel.148 We can see this attitude also operating outside the trial in the reporting of some 
crimes. Headlines such as ‘Chilling Footage Shows “No Comment” Interview with Killer 
Michael Stirling…’,149 ‘The “No Comment” Interview with Stephen Hough that Helped 
Convince Cops they had Found Janet Commins’ Real Killer’150 or ‘Paedophile Matthew 
Falder’s Cocky “No Comment” Interview after Finally Being Caught’151 suggests a growing 
culture for drawing adverse inferences. There are echoes here of the advocate defendant.152 
This new performative defendant, however, is expected to engage throughout the criminal 
justice process. Moreover, it appears that, as a result in the pervasive use of new technologies 
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such as smartphones and social media, the performative defendant must not only convince the 
jury but also the wider public. 
 
‘Digilantism’ 
The underlying implication of guilt behind adverse inferences echoes the notions of 
deservingness discussed in the introduction of this article. The reaction towards bin Laden’s 
death appear to suggest that in some cases a criminal trial itself is not deserved. Were this the 
only example then it could be explained away on the basis of the exceptional circumstances. 
However, there are indications of a more subtle and widespread change in attitude towards the 
criminal trial. The growth of social media allows individuals to participate in crime news and 
to investigate. Described as ‘performative communities’153 there have been growing incidents 
of people taking justice into their own hands. This not only threatens the rights-bearing 
defendant, it also appears to suggest that in some cases a criminal trial itself is not deserved. 
 Perceptions of criminal justice are heavily influenced by its reporting.154 Although 
some people source crime news through social media, for most of the public the news media 
remains the primary source of information on criminal justice.155 However, increased news 
media competition is resulting in a ‘hyper-competitive “do what it takes” 24-7 news media 
sphere’, and is leading to a more sensationalised reporting style.156 As a result, criminal 
defendants are increasingly finding themselves condemned in a ‘court of public opinion’.157 
Newspaper condemnation of defendants is nothing new, however the tone of crime reporting 
has shifted from a rhetoric of crime as a one-off, horrific event to one that ‘could happen to 
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you’.158 As a result criminal acts become more personalised, inviting greater reader engagement 
with the crime and empathy with the victims. 
Social media is increasingly becoming an outlet where the public can comment on and 
digest crime news. This ‘virtual condolence book’159 can amplify feelings of grief, connecting 
individuals to crime in a way that transcends normal geographic boundaries. Online 
conversations may be short-lived,160 but it can increase a sense of punitiveness against the 
defendant. Trending hashtags after criminal events such as #RIPLeeRigby after the 2013 
Woolwich killing, or the widespread use of the worker bee, a symbol of the city, after the 2017 
Manchester Arena bombing, not only demonstrate widespread solidarity against the crime, but 
could also be amplifying feelings of anger and revenge against those accused of such crimes. 
 Interaction with crime is not a new phenomenon; indeed, as noted above, early forms 
of crime detection relied on the hue and cry and the participation of the community. Since the 
birth of mass media crime has captured the public imagination.161 The growing use of 
smartphones allow eyewitnesses to record crime as it occurs. This footage can then be 
disseminated in real time via social media sites. Imagery has always added to the 
sensationalism of a crime, and CCTV footage has factored into news stories for several 
decades.162 What is new, however, is that this smartphone footage, and the resultant rhetoric of 
the crime and the accused, is not controlled by the police. For example, the Woolwich killers 
were named online within 24 hours of the attack, ten days before they were officially named 
by the police.163 This enabled widespread speculation and commentary about the two suspects 
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in the news media.164 The fact that social media enables such widespread public engagement 
can have significant implications for the rights-bearing defendant, particularly through the 
erosion of the presumption of innocence. 
When the defendant is captured red-handed and almost in real time, public 
understanding of guilt and innocence can become blurred, which can call into question the 
purpose of the criminal trial. This was illustrated in the online treatment of the two teenagers 
tried for the murder of Angela Wrighton in December 2014. The age of the perpetrators, 13 
and 14, as well as the brutality of the crime,165 attracted media attention. However, the 
Wrighton case is also noteworthy for the role of social media. The children had broadcast their 
actions on Snapchat and Facebook Messenger, adding to the sense of callousness of the crime. 
Social media also provided an outlet for the public to express their horror at events. The level 
of vitriol directed at the defendants resulted in one mistrial and in severe reporting restrictions, 
including preventing news media outlets from linking their stories to social media 
comments.166 Indeed, the impact of social media in this case has resulted in the Attorney-
General starting an inquiry into the impact of social media on criminal trials more broadly.167 
Similarly, the naming and shaming of the then-alleged killer of six-year-old Alesha MacPhail 
has resulted in a prosecution under the Contempt of Court Act 1981, after one woman named 
and shamed the suspect on social media.168 The defendants in both trials had their identities 
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been described as ‘torture’ by some media outlets. See, for example, N Parveen ‘Teenage Girls Who Tortured 
Angela Wrightson to Death Given Life Sentences’ The Guardian (London: 7/4/16). 
166 ‘Angela Wrightson Killers: A Friendship that Ended in Murder’ (BBC: 13/6/17) 
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-35977027) [Accessed: 26/2/19]). This was heavily criticised in some 
news outlets. See, for example, G Allen ‘This Picture of Angela Wrightson’s “Snapchat Killers” is all We will 
Ever See of Them’ Mirror (London: 7/4/16). 
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protected by the court. The acts of naming and shaming, alongside the vitriolic online 
commentary suggests that there is a perception that the criminal trial is obscuring justice, rather 
than facilitating it. 
 Social media also allows individuals to investigate crime and take matters of justice 
into their own hands; the most prominent example are so-called paedophile hunters. These 
individuals attempt to lure paedophiles to a meeting by posing as children online. Often filmed 
or live-streamed to social media sites, the alleged paedophiles are then confronted by a group 
of people who shout accusations and insults whilst they await the police. Described as 
‘digilantism’169 the motives behind these vigilante groups are illuminating. Yardley et al have 
found that there are a range of reasons someone might engage in web sleuthing, from being a 
victim of a similar crime to wanting to see justice done.170 In the case of paedophile hunters, 
there appears to be a strong desire for the latter, as demonstrated in interviews171 and in the 
names of the groups such as ‘Dark Justice’ or ‘Justice Will Be Served’. Trottier suggests that 
the rise in online vigilantism is due to a decreased faith in the criminal justice system, among 
other things.172 
  We are seeing growing ‘digilantism’ in the UK, sometime with disastrous results. 
Darren Kelly was fatally stabbed by Chris Carroll, who believed Kelly to be a paedophile. 
Kelly had gone to the meeting believing he was going to meet the mother of a 15-year-old 
girl.173 Similarly, Bijan Ebrahimi was beaten to death by his neighbours Lee James and Stephen 
 
news/woman-arrested-revealing-identity-teen-12890614) [Accessed: 26/2/19]). Aaron Campbell was identified 
as McPhail’s killer on 21st February 2019 after a court order to protect his identity was lifted a day after he was 
convicted of murder. 
169 A term first coined by J Nhan, L Huey and R Broll ‘Digilantism: An Analysis of Crowdsourcing and the Boston 
Marathon Bombings’ (2017) 57 The British Journal of Criminology 341. 
170 E Yardley, A Lynes, D Wilson and E Kelly ‘What’s the Deal with “Websleuthing”? News Media 
Representations of Amateur Detectives in Networked Spaces’ (2018) 14 Crime, Media, Culture 81 p 86. 
171 For example see J Warrington ‘The Controversial Rise of Vigilante Paedophile Hunters’ (Vice: 19/4/18) 
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Norley who believed Ebrahimi to be a paedophile. They then set Ebrahimi’s body on fire. An 
Iranian refugee with learning difficulties, accusations against Ebrahimi had begun to circulate 
on the estate he lived in after he began to take pictures of children who were harassing him; 
there is no evidence to suggest he was a paedophile.174 
 Anti-paedophile violence is nothing new,175 nor is the notion of vigilante justice. 
Indeed, after the News of the World published details of all convicted sex offenders in protest 
at the Home Secretary’s decision not pass Sarah’s Law a mob infamously attacked those named 
and living in the Paulsgrove estate.176 However, this activity is growing and becoming more 
mainstream in part due to the ease of access to social media. The use of evidence obtained by 
paedophile hunters to change suspects increased seven-fold in 2015, with 150 instances of such 
evidence being used in 2017.177 If the criminal justice process allows individuals to exact 
justice against those they believe are guilty, the idea the criminal trial is something we deserve 
and, by implication, earn becomes less exceptional. The pressures on the criminal trial are clear,  
the growth of apparent ‘evidence’ of guilt may be reframing notions of justice and, thus, the 
rights-bearing defendant. The hints of a performative defendant as a result of adverse 
inferences become more acute in this context. 
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HOW DOES THE MUTABLE DEFENDANT CHANGE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF 
MODERN CRIMINAL JUSTICE? 
The rights-bearing defendant is in a precarious position. As has been established, the 
defendant’s role in the criminal trial is capable of extraordinary change. Moreover, this change 
can be a considerable departure from legal traditions and can occur without a conscious policy 
to do so. The criminal justice process reflects, in part, the needs of contemporaneous society. 
The issues highlighted in the final section of this article are examples of the many potential 
pressures on the rights-bearing defendant. Other examples include the cuts to legal aid,178 
implementation of recent anti-terrorism legislation,179 or the potentially coercive nature of the 
guilty plea.180 As this article has demonstrated, the role of accused is changeable and subject 
to external pressures. This mutable defendant provides a new theoretical framework though 
which to assess the future impact of even apparently minor reforms to the criminal justice 
process. 
 As we have seen, during a period of sparsely populated but interdependent 
communities, the focus of the Anglo-Norman criminal trial was not on the defendant, but on 
encouraging reconciliation to prevent a blood feud. The ordeals created the penitent defendant. 
The de-facto abolition of the ordeals in 1215 was one of only a few conscious attempts to 
change the procedural status quo. The English jury system was a development of the ordeal of 
compurgation and continued to draw upon community knowledge in order to establish guilt. A 
by-product of this requirement was the advocate defendant who necessarily had a central role 
in the criminal trial. The Marian Statutes, aimed at addressing a perceived imbalance in favour 
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863. 
180 For further discussion see R Helm ‘Conviction by Consent? Vulnerability, Autonomy, and Conviction by 
Guilty Plea’ (2019) 83 The Journal of Criminal Law 161. 
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of the accused, indirectly changed the defendant’s role once again, entrenching the advocate 
defendant and inadvertently establishing a prosecutorial bias. This bias, exploited by the crown 
during a period of authoritarianism, led to elite calls for reform for treason trials, the first 
example of a rights-bearing defendant. Although it occurred gradually over the course of the 
eighteenth century, and as a result of the mysterious increase in lawyers in felony trials, this 
rights-bearing defendant became entrenched as the adversarial methodology developed. Due 
process, a key aspect of the rights-bearing defendant became statutorily enforced in England 
and Wales throughout the nineteenth century. The twentieth century saw the rights-bearing 
defendant established in the pre-trial investigation with the enactment of provisions such as 
PACE. 
 There are indications that we might be witnessing a move towards a new iteration of 
the mutable defendant; indeed, there are hints of the emergence of what is described here as 
the performative defendant. Certainly, the notion of deservingness evident in the reaction to 
the death of bin Laden is not compatible with the rights-bearing defendant and a due process-
adhering criminal trial designed to protect the accused from the might of the state and arbitrary 
punishment. Bin Laden is an exceptional example, but history has demonstrated, with the 
Treason Trials Act, for example, that exceptional examples can have a profound, albeit gradual, 
impact on the criminal trial as a whole. There is a risk that new developments to criminal justice 
may eventually echo these notions of deservingness. The use of adverse inferences creates a 
subtle presumption of guilt for any defendant who does not participate in their criminal trial. 
Worryingly, the statutory provisions have been judicially expanded and there are indications of 
a broader cultural acceptance that failure to participate equates to guilt. This notion 
fundamentally contradicts the rights-bearing defendant, who is entitled to be passive as a check 
against state tyranny. Indeed, such attitudes are more akin to the advocate defendant. However, 
the performative defendant goes beyond the advocate defendant, as they are expected to 
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participate throughout the criminal justice process and even, in some cases, to convince the 
wider public, not just the judge or jury of their innocence. Social media, facilitated by a hyper-
competitive news media, is increasingly being used to digest and comment on crime news. This 
can result in intense vitriol being directed at defendants sometimes, such as with Angela 
Wrighton’s killers, with severe implications for the criminal trial. The rise in ‘digilantism’, 
such as in the case of paedophile hunters, are facilitating acts of individual justice. Tragically, 
this has resulted in the deaths of innocent people. Whilst anti-paedophile action is nothing new, 
it demonstrates a lack of faith in the criminal justice system. What is new is that these vigilantes 
are able to view, produce and disseminate apparent ‘evidence’ of guilt, giving greater credence 
to their actions. It should not be forgotten that it was a lack of faith in the criminal justice 
system, albeit with the Whig elites, that facilitated the adversarial revolution. 
 The mutable defendant provides a useful theoretical framework through which to better 
assess the capacity of reforms and societal changes to place pressure on, and indeed alter, the 
criminal justice system. Even though the rights-bearing defendant, through due process 
protections such as the presumption of innocence, has been globally entrenched, it is important 
to remember the damaging effects that seemingly minor erosions of procedural values can have 
on the overall process. Thus, this article serves as a warning; the defendant, in short, is capable 
of changing again. 
